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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1257 
_____________ 
  
J.D., By his mother; FELISHA MARTINEZ 
  
v. 
  
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
      Felisha Martinez, on behalf of J.D.,  
                           Appellant 
      
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01304) 
District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2015 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed October 28, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellant J.D. appeals his denial of disability insurance benefits.  We will affirm 
the District Court’s order affirming the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).   
I. Background 
 On August 31, 2009, J.D.’s mother, Felisha Martinez, filed a claim on his behalf 
requesting disability insurance benefits for the period of August 2009 through March 
2013.  J.D. suffers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant 
disorder.  His application was denied and J.D. requested a hearing before an ALJ.  After a 
hearing at which J.D. and his mother testified, the ALJ determined that J.D. did not suffer 
from an impairment or disability that would warrant disability benefits.  The Appeals 
Council denied J.D.’s request for review.   
 J.D. appealed that decision to the District Court, and the appeal was referred to a 
United States Magistrate Judge.  The Magistrate Judge recommended affirming the denial 
of benefits.  The District Court adopted the recommendation, and this timely appeal 
follows.     
II. Standard of Review 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “The role of this Court is 
identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 
(3d Cir. 1999).  “Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla. It 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’”  Id. 
(quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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III. Discussion 
 First, J.D argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of J.D.’s 
psychologist, Dr. Mitchell, who found that J.D. had marked or extreme limitations of 
functioning in all domains except for health and physical well-being.  The ALJ assigned 
little weight to this opinion because, among other things, there was no evidence that Dr. 
Mitchell treated or evaluated J.D.  He argues that the ALJ overlooked evidence that Dr. 
Mitchell was his treating psychologist since at least May 2011.   
 We agree that there was evidence in the record before the ALJ that Dr. Mitchell 
was J.D.’s treating psychologist.  But substantial evidence nonetheless supported the 
ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Mitchell’s opinion little weight.  As the ALJ noted, Dr. 
Mitchell gave no narrative or explanation for his opinion, which was given in a checklist 
form.  See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (noting that an ALJ “may afford a treating 
physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting 
explanations are provided”); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Form reports in which a physician’s obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank 
are weak evidence at best.”).  Moreover, the ALJ noted that Dr. Mitchell’s opinion was 
inconsistent with treatment notes from his colleagues at Northwestern Human Services 
who were also treating J.D. 
Second, J.D. argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Ms. 
O’Rourke, J.D.’s second grade special education teacher.  She indicated that J.D. was 
performing at lower than a second grade level and had problems functioning within 
various domains.  The ALJ noted that Ms. O’Rourke’s statements were “provided from 
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the perspective of functioning in a regular classroom and [she] does not provide 
information regarding how well or not well [J.D.] does in the special education 
environment.”  App. 48.  J.D. argues that the ALJ discounted the opinion of Ms. 
O’Rourke because she focused on the regular classroom environment even though the 
ALJ must consider J.D.’s functioning as compared to children who do not have 
impairments.  See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(a)(2)(iii).   
The ALJ gave the opinion limited weight because Ms. O’Rourke, a special 
education teacher, opined as to J.D.’s functioning outside of her special education 
classroom.  The ALJ also noted that her opinion was inconsistent with other school 
records.  For example, Ms. O’Rourke stated that J.D. had serious problems focusing and 
completing assignments when other school records showed that J.D. was satisfactory in 
using time wisely.  Ms. O’Rourke’s lack of first-hand observations, and the apparent 
conflict between her opinion and other evidence, were proper bases to accord her opinion 
little weight.  20 C.F.R. §§ 416.913(d)–(e), 416.924a(b)(7)(ii).     
 Third, J.D. argues that the ALJ failed to consider pertinent evidence when 
assessing J.D.’s capabilities in the domain of “Interacting and Relating with Others.”  See 
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that ALJ must explain 
rejection of probative evidence).  J.D. asserts that the ALJ did not consider his 
Individualized Educational Program (“IEP”) report.  Although the ALJ did not discuss 
the IEP when analyzing J.D.’s capabilities in the domain of “Interacting and Relating 
with Others,” the ALJ did summarize and discuss the IEP earlier in her decision and that 
consideration of the evidence was sufficient.   J.D. also argues that the ALJ failed to 
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consider or mention his Oral and Written Language Scales (“OWLS”).  The OWLS were 
included in the IEP, however, and, as we have discussed, the ALJ adequately considered 
the IEP evidence.   
 Fourth, J.D. argues that he functionally equals the childhood disability listings and 
that we should direct the District Court to award benefits.  We decline to do so in this 
instance.  Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 357–58 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“The decision to direct the district court to award benefits should be made only when the 
administrative record of the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence 
on the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” 
(quoting Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221–22 (3d Cir. 1984))).  As we have 
discussed, the ALJ’s decision to decline to award benefits was supported by substantial 
evidence and J.D. has not identified any errors that might call for a re-do.     
*  *  *  * * 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District 
Court.1  
 
                                              
1 Appellant’s unopposed motions for leave to file volume II of the joint appendix under 
seal and to file a supplemental appendix are granted.   
